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Abstract
Social Networks (SNs) have been gradually applied by utility companies as an addition to
smart grid and are proved to be helpful in smoothing load curves and reducing energy usage.
However, SNs also bring in new threats to smart grid: misinformation in SNs may cause smart
grid users to alter their demand, resulting in transmission line overloading and in turn leading
to catastrophic impact to the grid. In this paper, we discuss the interdependency in the social
network coupled smart grid and focus on its vulnerability. That is, how much can the smart
grid be damaged when misinformation related to it diffuses in SNs? To analytically study the
problem, we propose the Misinformation Attack Problem in Social-Smart Grid (MAPSS) that
identifies the top critical nodes in the SN, such that the smart grid can be greatly damaged
when misinformation propagates from those nodes. This problem is challenging as we have
to incorporate the complexity of the two networks concurrently. Nevertheless, we propose a
technique that can explicitly take into account information diffusion in SN, power flow balance
and cascading failure in smart grid integratedly when evaluating node criticality, based on
which we propose various strategies in selecting the most critical nodes. Also, we introduce
controlled load shedding as a protection strategy to reduce the impact of cascading failure. The
effectiveness of our algorithms are demonstrated by experiments on IEEE bus test cases as well
as the Pegase data set.
Keywords— Social network, smart grid, cascading failure, interdependent networks, power
grid
1 Introduction
A smart grid is the next generation of power grid based on information technology and real-time
data processing which allow the implementation of strategies to control and optimize the electric
network. The recent literature has not only focused on addressing the technological hardware
and software features of the smart grid, but also on the social dimension of the grid [1, 2]. In the
past few years, media has been coining the idea of connecting the online social networks with
smart grid and exploring it as combined research topic [3, 4, 5]. Social network and smart grid
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have been studied much individually; however, there exists limited work in the linked smart
grid and social network. A number of recent papers propose frameworks or approaches that
interconnect smart meters (or smart homes) as SNs for energy management and sharing [6, 7].
In addition, several frameworks or simulation models for demand side management and value-
added web services with social networking aspects have been developed [8, 9, 10]. Several others
[11, 12] have used simulation models to demonstrate the feasibility of social coordination in
supply and demand. Our research work focuses on the impact of social network on the smart
grid, when they are linked together.
The social computing will integrate and enhance many digital systems over the next decade
and the smart grid is no exception [13, 14]. Smart grid efficiency depends on utility customers
having knowledge about demand response programs and being actively engaged in energy man-
agement. And this is exactly where social network comes into the picture and can really have
an impact. Social computing can also expand the adoption and adaptation of smart grid tech-
nologies through the peer to peer communication in local communities via social network. It
also could change large scale behavior through crowd-shifting basing on the theory “people de-
cide how to behave based on what they see others doing, especially if those others seem similar
to themselves" [15, 16]. Through the social network, the utility companies can learn about
their customers’ needs, expectations, and demands, leading to smarter, modernized, efficient
and reliable energy systems that deliver lower prices, fewer outages, and lower emissions to the
customers. For example [4], the company OPower creates a demographic profile in Arlington,
VA based on energy consumption data from its smart meters, and groups similar households
into communities. OPower then allows these groups to compare their energy usage against each
other and compete head-to-head to see who can reduce energy consumption the most. Social
network for smart grid (SSG) would serve as a strong pillar in making smart grid smarter by
including the customers and their real time peer-to-peer data sharing.
However, this also opens up a channel for the attackers to attack the power grid utility
service. Attacks through social network can use the crowd-shifting strategy as well as informa-
tion propagation to spread misinformation among the customers. This includes false electricity
prices where the customers might increase their load given a lower price and shut off their
utilities given a higher price. Misinformation such as future power failure or breakdown can
also trick the customers to alter their power usage. As the integration of social network into
smart grid is inevitable, so are the problems associated with the integration. Although social
network misinformation attacks have been studied [17, 18, 19], its effects were not extended to
the critical infrastructure. Thus, considering the possible catastrophic impact on the smart grid
when demands on loads are altered [25], it is crucial to study and analyzing the vulnerability of
smart grid from the coupled social network.
In this paper, to better understand the vulnerability of smart grid, we aim at finding the
most critical nodes in the coupled social network, such that when those nodes believe in the
misinformation on smart grid, they may spread the misinformation to a large portion of nodes
in the social network and in turn results in severe failure in the smart grid. We term the
problem as Misinformation Attack Problem in Social-smart grid (MAPSS). The critical nodes
found in MAPSS can guide the utility companies and the social network administrators to apply
corresponding precautions to failures.
Nonetheless, MAPSS is challenging as we need to consider not only the complicated infor-
mation diffusion phenomenon and power network dynamics themselves, but also their inter-
dependency. If we only consider maximizing the misinformation diffusion, the result can be
suboptimal as the influenced nodes may not be critical in the smart grid. Also, it is hard to find
critical nodes in the smart grid itself for MAPSS, as the constraint on the number of critical
nodes is for the social network and we have no prior knowledge on number of critical nodes
for the smart grid. To cope with the challenges, we propose techniques that can obtain the
criticality of nodes and set of nodes and then calculate the most critical nodes in an integrated
fashion.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
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• We propose and define a new research problem MAPSS that identifies the most critical
nodes in social network coupled smart grid, which helps in understanding the vulnerability
of this new system.
• We propose various attack strategies to the challenging problem of MAPSS. The Greedy
Social Attack (GSA) can be useful when little of the smart grid is known. When smart grid
information is available, the Social Power Attack (SPA) can explicitly consider cascading
failure and calculate the criticality of the subset of social nodes based on their impact to
the smart grid. SPA has two variations, SPA-Concurrent (SPA-C) attacks all the nodes at
the same time; when a longer attack period is allowed, SPA-Sequential (SPA-S) launches
attacks in rounds, the decision of each round is based on current network status, and thus
can result in severer failures.
• We introduce Controlled Load Shedding (CLS) as a protection strategy which stabilizes
the system by load curtailment and load shedding.
• We test our attack strategies in various simulation settings with realistic social network
and power network datasets and proved their effectiveness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the existing efforts on integrating
the SNs with smart grid in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss the models about the power
grid, the information diffusion in the social network and the integrated social/power network.
We also define MAPSS and prove its NP-hardness. The attack and protection strategies are
described in Section 4 and 5 respectively. We present the experiments in Section 6 and conclude
the paper in Section 7.
2 Social Network Integration
Smart grid promises to offer energy and money savings to both utility companies and consumers.
Different pricing programs used by utility companies had performed well at small scale in opt-in
trials, but had consistently failed to successfully scale [20]. For example, Exelon companies
Baltimore Gas and Electric (BGE) and Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) chose to deploy peak-
time rebate (PTR) programs capable of reaching all of their customers. They both realized that
price alone was insufficient to scale dynamic pricing programs. A close study of similar efforts
in California showed that lack of customer awareness led to insignificant program participation
and, in turn, program impact.
Thus, customer interaction and continuous real time engagement play an important role in
achieving the goal set by smart grid along with the right technological advances. Social Network
has already shown the world its power in the above requirements and is demonstrated in the
literature as shown in Table 1.
And rightly so, utility companies have started integrating social network to connect their
customers. Some of the existing social networking tools available are GreenPocket (sharing
experiences and contest participation), OPower (Facebook based community approach to sharing
energy saving tips), Ensemble (customer interaction through incentives and competitions).
Social network strives on the principle that people want to do what others like them are
doing. This forms the basis of the customer engagement and interaction and drives towards
achieving energy efficiency and savings. However, using this crowd-shifting theory, attackers
could propagate false information, engaging customers in time critical competitions all directed
to change load profiles of customers in a community hidden from the utility companies. The
attack can be significant enough, when combining with other such attacks, to produce line
failures leading to massive blackouts. In our observation, this is the first work of its kind to
consider the effect of social networking in the power grid and understand the real impact of
misinformation propagation in the social network on the power grid.
Electricity consumers may be users in the social networking tools developed by the utility
companies. As opposed to the normal information propagation, the users might be involved in
sharing or forwarding message [21] such as (1) A general information, (2) A load-shifting tip,
3
Table 1: Impact of social network
Literature Impact of SSG
[7] Smooth load curve for households,
hence no extra costly power plant
capacity will be required.
[8] 6% reduction in peak load, aggres-
sive incentives reached a 14% reduc-
tion in peak load.
[10] Consumers reduced their annual en-
ergy usage by an average of 2.8%
when given comparison information
with other peopleвҐЄs energy con-
sumption.
[11] Energy savings of 7-9% by mutual
sharing through social network.
and (3) An energy-reduction tip. In this paper, we are concerned with the message types (2)
and (3) and the impact of the misinformation associated with the above types of messages in
the social network.
3 Model
In this section, we describe the models for information diffusion in the social network, model
for the power grid network and the overall model connecting the users on the social network to
their corresponding load nodes. The notations used in this section are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of Notations for Section 3
Variable Meaning
GS GS = (VS , ES , w), the social net-
work
GP GP = (VP , EP ), Power grid network
with nodes and transmission lines.
P Set of power generation nodes.
D Set of demand nodes.
pi Power generation output of node i.
di Load demand of node i.
fij Power flow in transmission line
(i, j).
uij Capacity of transmission line (i, j).
3.1 Social Network Model
We model the social network as a weighted directed graph GS = (VS , ES , p) with a node set
VS and a directed edge set ES , where a node v ∈ VS represents a user and an edge (u, v) ∈ ES
exists if and only if node v is connected to node u, that either node v can receive the information
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Figure 1: In this figure, the model as well as the problem MAPSS are discussed. In Fig. (a), the
social network GS with its users VS and the connections in between them ES are represented by the
directed edges and each user uS has a corresponding node in the power network GP . ud represents
the utility company in the social network. Note that attacking the SN through ud is not feasible as
the company can easily identify the attack, so we do not consider it. In the power network, nodes
are represented by uld ∈ Vld and usrc ∈ Vsrc. Note there could be power nodes without their social
network profile. The attack starts with a user in a social network i.e. seed node. In Fig (b), the
corresponding node in the power network starts increasing the load. Meanwhile the information
starts spreading and influences other nodes in the social network. The corresponding failure in the
power grid is represented by Fig (c). Because of the numerous load changes, it might to thermal
and cascading failure leading to failure of other edges and nodes as shown in Fig (d).
shared or directly sent from u. Also each (u, v) is associated with a weight puv ∈ [0, 1] to denote
the probability of information propagation, which is discussed below.
Information Propagation In order to model the information propagation in the social
network, we will focus on the Independent Cascading (IC) model which is widely adopted [22].
However, the results can be easily extended to other propagation models such as the Linear
Threshold (LT) model.
In the IC Model, initially no nodes adopt the misinformation. Given a seed set S, the
misinformation diffusion proceeds in rounds. In round 0, all nodes v ∈ S are influenced by the
misinformation and all other nodes remain uninfluenced. In round t ≥ 1, all nodes influenced at
round t− 1 will try to influence their neighbors based on the edge weights. A node u influenced
at round t− 1 has probability puv to influence an uninfluenced neighbor v at time t. u cannot
influence any neighbors at any time t′ > t and it stays influenced till the end. The process
stops when no more nodes can be influenced. We denote I(S) as the expected number of nodes
influenced by the misinformation with S as the seed set, where the expectation is taken over all
puv. We call I(S) as the influence spread of seed set S.
3.2 Power grid Model
We use the linearized DC power flow model to describe the power flow in the power grid.
In the linearized approximation, we are given a power grid represented by a directed graph
GP = (VP , EP ), where:
• Each node i ∈ VP corresponds to either a power generator (i.e., a supply node), or to a
load (i.e., a demand node), or to a node that neither generates nor consumes power.
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• If node i is a generator and it is operating, then its output must be in the range [Pmini ,
Pmaxi ] where 0 ≤ Pmini ≤ Pmaxi ; if the generator is not operated, then its output is zero.
The set of generators is denoted by P .
• If node i is a demand, then the "nominal" demand is given by Dnomi . The set of demand
nodes is denoted by D.
• The edges EP represent power/transmission lines. For each line (i, j), two parameters are
given i.e. piij > 0 (the resistance or reactance) and uij (the capacity).
Now, given a set P of operating generators, the linearized power flow is a solution to the
system of constraints given in the following set of the equations. For each edge (i, j), fij
represents the power flow on the edge (transmission line) (i, j). In the case where fij < 0, power
is effectively flowing from j to i. Additionally, the phase angle at node i is given by the variable
θi. Given a node i, δ+(i)(δ−(i)) is the set of lines oriented out of (into) node i and N(i) is
collection of nodes connected to i. The power flow equations are given below:
∑
(i,j)∈δ+
i
fij −
∑
(j,i)∈δ−
i
fji =
 pi i ∈ P−di i ∈ D
0 otherwise
(1)
θi − θj − piijfij = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ EP (2)
pmini ≤ pi ≤ pmaxi , ∀i ∈ P (3)
0 ≤ dj ≤ dnomj , ∀j ∈ D (4)
3.2.1 Cascading failure model
Next, we describe the cascading failure model in Algorithm 1. This is an extension of the
model in [25]. In the event of line failures, there might be formation of components, that are
disconnected from each other. Following this, we adjust the total demand equal to the total
supply. We then recalculate the power flows in the network using the power equations. The new
flows may exceed the capacity and as a result, the corresponding lines will become overheated
and thus vulnerable to failure. We assume that the cascade proceeds without encountering any
intervention from the system operator for the majority of the paper, to evaluate the worst-case
vulnerability of the smart grid. In order to model system intervention, we develop a protection
strategy in parallel.
Algorithm 1: Cascade Failure Model
Input: Connected Power grid Network G(V,E)
Output: S1: Lines which failed, S2: Nodes which failed
1 while Network is not stable do
2 Adjust the total supply to the total demand within each island.
3 Use equations (1)-(4) to calculate power flows in G.
4 For all lines, compute the moving average f˜ tij = αfij + (1− α)f˜ t−1ij .
5 Remove all lines that have moving average flows greater than the capacity (f˜ tij > uij) and
add to S1.
6 Add the failed nodes to S2.
7 If no more line fails, then network is stable, break the loop.
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3.2.2 Line failure
Similar to [25], the transmission line failure is caused by overloaded lines. The outages are
modeled based on moving average flow f˜ tij , where f˜ tij = αfij + (1 − α)f˜ t−1ij . A general outage
rule gives the fault probability of the line (i, j), given its moving average f˜ tij . In this paper, line
failure happens when f˜ tij > uij .
3.3 Interdependency Model
In this section, we discuss the interdependency between the social network and power grid as
shown in Fig. 1. In the smart grid, social network will be used as the tool to actively involve
the consumers in through channels such as peer to peer communication, community based
discussion and user experience forums. The customers can engage in demand and response
programs and actively share energy data among themselves. This not only helps the utility
distributor in energy management but also helps in making smart grid really "smart". This
data can be shared through a dashboard that offers user-friendly data displays, such as graphs
of energy consumption over time, which allow for remote monitoring of energy use from an office
computer, tablet or smart phone. Information such as where energy is being spent, the benefits
of conservation or efficiency measures, as well as anomalies, such as energy usage levels that fall
outside of norms or expectations will be made available at the real time.
Every node uP ∈ D ⊆ VP 1 is a customer in the power utility service (such as a residential
house, an industrial building, etc) and is associated with the social network account represented
by user uS ∈ VS . We denote the collection of correspondence (uP , uS) as EPS . Social networking
gives the opportunity to users uS ∈ VS to add other users and community members as friends
in order to share their energy usage, offers, pricing etc. Utility companies can use the social
network to denote change in price, real-time demand and supply and issue any warnings as
required, in order to changing the demand pattern of the customers in the power network via
crowd-shifting in the SN. Once a user accepts the information coming from its neighbors (i.e.
is "influenced") s/he alters the load in the house in real-time to save money or equipments (in
case of potential power cuts and surges).
The attackers might exploit the social network designed for keeping customer active in the
smart grid system, via spreading misinformation about price changes, power surges etc. In this
paper, we consider a specific type of attack (misinformation attack) that in the social network,
the attacker might spread information about the lowering of the electricity price for a few hours
during the day. This would lead to users increasing their load at their residence during those
times to utilize the lower rates, which is followed by sudden spikes in the demand, making the
system unstable. A coordinated attack as this would lead to line failures and thus cascading
failures causing massive blackouts and equipment damages.
Consider the power grid GP as discussed in Sect. 3.2. We shall use the notation F (GP ) to
denote the number of nodes in D which do not have a path to any node in P in GP . That
is, they are disconnected from the sources of power generation and hence considered as failed
nodes.
With the given models in mind, we define the MAPSS problem as follows:
Definition 1 (MAPSS). Given the social network GS = (VS , ES , p), power network GP =
(VP , EP ) and edge set EPS, identify k nodes in GS, whose activation would lead to maximum
number of failed/disconnected nodes in GP based on misinformation attack.
MAPSS is NP-hard as its special case where ES = ∅ is similar to the RAA problem defined
in [25] and is proved to be NP-hard. Also, using the result from the same paper, MAPSS cannot
be approximated within a factor of O(|EP |1−η) for any η > 0, unless P=NP.
1Note that in addition to the load nodes being a part of the social network, the utility distribution company and
power generation companies are also the members of the social network. By this they are able to send important
information to the customers regarding the demand supply, price information and other real-time usage statistics of
the power grid.
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4 Attack Strategies
In this section, we propose several approaches for MAPSS. The first approach, Greedy Social
Attack (GSA), greedily selects social nodes iteratively, maximizing the marginal gain of social
node activation I(S) and calculating the impact to GP . This approach is useful when the
knowledge on GP is limited to the attacker. When GP is available to the attack, two more
advanced approaches are proposed to launch Social Power Attack (SPA) considering cascading
failure during social node selection. The difference between the two methods is on whether the
nodes are selected concurrently (SPA-C) or sequentially (SPA-S).
4.1 Greedy Social Attack (GSA)
The motivation behind this attack is to spread misinformation in the SN as much as possible
without concerning about corresponding impact of load node failures in the power network.
Denote V pS as the set of SN users corresponding to power nodes in GP . Then, we can utilize
targeted influence maximization algorithms such as BCT [26] to calculate the desired seed set.
The failure in GP can be obtained by first retrieving the influenced nodes in GS and then
applying Alg. 1 in GP . We describe the details of GSA in Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2: Greedy Social Attack (GSA)
Input: GS(VS , ES), V
p
S ⊆ VS ,k
Output: S, F (GP )
1 Initialize S = ∅
2 Calculate S, |S| ≤ k based on the algorithm BCT [26] with uniform cost and V pS as the target
set. Set benefit for all v ∈ V pS as 1 and benefit for all other nodes as 0.
3 Return S
GSA can be launched when the attacker only gains access to the social network. Hence, the
advantage of using this algorithm is the attacker can launch the attack without the knowledge
of the load profiles, the power network topology and other statistics which might have been
hidden from general users of the social network deployed by the utility companies.
Algorithm 3: Cascading Impact Calculator (CIC)
Input: GS(VS , ES), GP (VP , EP ), S
Output: CI
1 for i ∈ VP do
2 Calculate cii.pload . Nodes to attack in GP to fail i
3 Calculate cii.nodes by Alg 1 . Damage when cii.pload nodes are attacked.
4 AS = cii.pload→ VS . Project power to social
5 while |AS | < |IAS (S′)| do
6 select uS = argmaxvS∈VS\S′(IAS (S
′ ∪ vS)− IAS (S′))
7 S′ = S′ ∪ {uS}
8 cii.seeds = S
′ − S
9 Return CI
4.2 Social Power Attack (SPA)
Although GSA can be launched quickly, the lack of knowledge of its impact on the power grid
does not result in large cascading failures, rather just high misinformation spread. In this
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section, we discuss SPA which explicitly takes cascading failure into consideration and focusing
on to maximize the number of node failures in the power network. It has two variations, SPA-
Concurrent (SPA-C) tries to select seed nodes concurrently and SPA-Sequential (SPA-S) tries to
identify seed nodes iteratively after assessing system state due to previous failures. To evaluate
cascading failure resulted from node failures, we first propose the Cascading Impact Calculator
(CIC) in Sect. 4.2.1 and then discuss SPA-C and SPA-S in subsequent sections.
4.2.1 Cascading Impact Calculator
In order to maximize the cascading impact of the attack, the Cascading Impact Calculator
(CIC), as described in Alg. 3, calculates the cascading impact of all nodes upon its failure, given
the current status of two networks and the selected seed nodes S. CIC returns the cascading
impact list CI that contains the cascade impact cii for each node i ∈ VP , including the seeds
cii.seeds ⊆ VS\S required to fail i and the set of failed nodes cii.nodes ⊆ D when i fails.
Function IAS (S′) calculates the number of influenced nodes in AS , which is the projected set of
nodes from the power network. S′ holds the seed nodes that are required to fail cii.nodes.
For calculating cii.pload, we construct the Integer Linear Program (ILP) as in Fig. 2 for
failing the target node, denoted as o in the ILP. The objective (5) asks for the minimum number
of nodes to attack so that node o is failed. The binary variable zi reaches 1 if the node i is
attacked. Constraint (6) guarantees the failure of node o (to = 1). Binary variable ti = 1
denotes that node i is not connected to any generator. The power flow equations are given by
constraint (7). The demand of node gets directly affected by the attack, i.e demand rises in case
of misinformation attack as shown in constraint (8), where d0i denotes the initial demand and ∆i
is the percentage of demand change when node i is affected. The corresponding change in power
min
∑
i∈D
zi (5)
s.t. to = 1 (6)
Equations (1)− (4) (7)
di = d
0
i (1 + zi ∗∆i), ∀i ∈ D (8)
pi = p
0
i + ∆p, ∀i ∈ P (9)
fij +Mωij ≥ uijyij , ∀ij ∈ EP (10)
− fij +M(1− ωij) ≥ uijyij , ∀ij ∈ EP (11)
M(1− ti) ≥
∑
j∈N(i)\P
(1− φij)
+
∑
j∈N(i)∩P
(1− yij), ∀i ∈ VP \P (12)
φij ≥ tj , ∀j ∈ VP \P, i ∈ N(j)\P (13)
φij ≥ yij , ∀j ∈ VP \P, i ∈ N(j)\P (14)
φij ≤ tj + yij , ∀j ∈ VP \P, i ∈ N(j)\P (15)
zi, ti ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ D (16)
yij , ωij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ij ∈ EP (17)
φij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ij ∈ EP ||ji ∈ EP (18)
Figure 2: The ILP for finding minimum number of nodes to attack in order to fail node o.
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generation is reflected in constraint (9). When necessary, we increase the power generated by
each generator by the same amount ∆p on top of the initial power generation p0i . Constraint
(10), (11) describes the case of power overflow, in which M is a large constant, which can be set
as the largest possible flow on a single line. The two constraints guarantee that if the absolute
value of the flow |fij | is beyond the line capacity uij , the line (i, j) will fail (binary variable
yij = 1). The connectivity of demand nodes to sources are calculated in constraint (12) where
the binary variable φij = 1 denotes no connection for i to P through j, and is guaranteed by
the auxiliary constraints (13)-(15).
4.2.2 SPA-Concurrent
SPA-C uses CIC for the following:
• cii.nodes : Nodes in the power network that fail due to the failure of nodes in cii.pload. Let
the sets of the failed nodes be represented by P = {P1, P2, ..., Pm}, where Pi = cii.nodes.
• cii.seeds : Seed nodes in the social network required to spread information to targeted
users in SSG and thus causing load imbalances in the power system leading to failure of i.
We represent the sets of the seed nodes by S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} with Si = cii.seeds.
Now SPA can be viewed as an arbitrary bipartite graph, with S social seed node sets on the
left side, P power failure node sets on the right side and edges representing relationship between
seed node selection and corresponding failure. The number of nodes in the power network is
m, which determines the number of sets in P and S. The seed node sets on the left side might
overlap. Objective hence becomes to find minimum cardinality of seed node sets (left-side) which
maximizes the covering failure node sets (right-side) in Fig. 3. xi and yj are binary variables
that represent the selection of node i for seed set in social network and failure of node j in
power grid respectively. ILP formulation is given as below. In the formulation, constraint (20)
restricts the budget to be at most k. Constraints (21) and (22) ensure the node failure status
yj = 1 when any seed set Si that can fail vj (vj ∈ Pi) is fully influenced. In constraint (21), M
is a large constant.
maximize
∑
j:vj∈VP
yj (19)
s.t.
∑
i:ui∈VS
xi ≤ k (20)
M(2− yj − ψlj) ≥ |Sl| −
∑
i∈Sl
xi,
∀j : vj ∈ VP ,∀l : vj ∈ Pl (21)∑
l:vj∈Pl
ψlj = 1 ∀j : vj ∈ VP (22)
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ VS (23)
yi ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ VP (24)
ψlj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j : vj ∈ VP ,∀l : vj ∈ Pl (25)
Although SPA-C identifies the seeds optimally, it does not take into account system state
changes which can alter the cascading impact of nodes. Since CIC calculates cii independently
of the failure of other nodes, it may lead to selection of less optimal seed nodes. Considering
this, we propose the SPA-S.
4.2.3 SPA-Sequential
Unlike SPA-C, in which all the seed nodes are selected concurrently, the approach SPA-S involves
iteratively: it chooses the seed nodes after assessing the failure caused by earlier seeds. CIC is
10
Seed node sets (xi) Power node failures
sets (yj)
Figure 3: SPA-C. The edges represent the correspondence of seed node failure with power node
failures as given by CIC.
called to re-evaluate the importance of each node in the updated and balanced power network
following the seed node selection and the cascading failure. With that information, SPA-S
(Alg. 4) tries to greedily select the node with the highest ci.nodes value, given the budget k for
the seed nodes is not exceeded. After each successful selection, k′, S and G′P are updated which
represent the budget, seed set and updated fault graph respectively.
Algorithm 4: Social Power Attack Sequential (SPA-S)
Input: GS(VS , ES), GP (VP , EP ), k
Output: S
1 k′ = 0, S = ∅
2 while k′ < k do
3 CI = CIC(G′P , GS , S)
4 Sort CI based on ci.nodes
5 foreach cii ∈ CI do
6 if #cii.seed < k − k′ then
7 S = S ∪ cii.seed
8 k′ = |S|
9 G′P = G
′
P − cii.nodes . Remove failed nodes
10 break
11 Return S
When there is no possibility to fail any node, we just add nodes from the social network to
the seed set S that minimize the yield of the power network as much as possible. This does
not follow through with the goal of maximizing the load failure, but decreases the yield of the
power network, which is a measure to understand the impact of attack on the power grid.
5 Protection Strategy
This section describes protection strategy from cascading failures due to the social network at-
tacks. Prevention of such attacks in social network can be achieved through monitoring of the
social network by the utility companies. However, there is always a probability of misinforma-
tion propagation leading to cascading failure. Also, optimal mitigation of cascading failure is
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impractical given the dynamics of the network, large size of practical power networks, social
network influence and multistage model as well as other reasons [31]. The problem becomes
more challenging as many new renewable sources of energy come to the aid of power generation
which leads to more dynamic generation.
Controlled Load Shedding (CLS): Restoring the grid to stable state once the cascading starts
is a challenging problem given the parameters as described above. However, by controlled load
shedding, smart grid should be able to minimize the damage. The above can be either achieved
by load curtailment (large industrial customers have agreement with utility companies, so that
they can be instructed to reduce demand in order to balance the system) or by load shedding
in case load curtailment does not stabilize the system. In order to keep the yield of the system
as high possible, we introduce the following linear program for controlled load shedding.
minimize
∑
i∈D
τi (26)
s.t. Equ(1)− (4) (27)
Di = D
t
i − τi, ∀i ∈ D (28)
pi = p
t
i − βi ∀i ∈ P (29)
fij <= uij ∀(i, j) ∈ EP (30)
fij >= −uij ∀(i, j) ∈ EP (31)
0 < τi ≤ Dti ∀i ∈ D (32)
0 < βi ≤ pti ∀i ∈ P (33)
In the formulation, the superscript t denotes the values at time t, as the damage controls depends
when CLS is implemented. τi denotes the value of load shedding or curtailment at a demand
node i with the largest change in load bounded by ∆Dmaxi in constraint (32) and the actual load
change in (28). Constraint (27) is the power flow equation. Constraints (33) and (29) represent
the generator ramp down in case of the fault by the utility company. No further line failures
are guaranteed by constraints (30), (31).
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate how the attack through social network can impact the power system
in various settings. We first discuss the experiment setup and data sets in the section 6.1 and
then demonstrate the impact of MAPSS and the protection strategy in the following sections.
6.1 Setup
Our goal in the experiments is to demonstrate the effectiveness and impact of MAPSS in social
network enabled power grid. The real-world data sets are limited due to very recent emergence
of this concept. However, we do have access to the data sets of individual systems (social
and power) and other resources that have just started researching the social power network
[21, 29, 30]. So in order to represent our model, we choose power systems as the base layer and
build the social network on the top of the power network. Power system datasets are chosen
from MATPOWER library [32]. The datasets used for our experiments are Pegase 1354 bus
test case, IEEE 30 bus test case and IEEE 300 bus test case.
To model information propagation in the OSNs, we use real-world Facebook network topology
from Stanford repository [33]. We sample a random set of connected users (same as the number
of users in the power network) from the Facebook dataset of 4039 users. The influence between
a pair of users was assigned randomly from a uniform distribution. The reason for such a setup
is that the social network for smart grid deployed for the consumers only rather than the full
set of consumers.
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For the link between the power grid and the SN, we construct an edge e(i, u) ∈ EPS between
each power utility consumer i ∈ VP and a SSG user u ∈ VS . With each unlinked demand node
i in VP , we randomly select an unlinked node u in VS and then map them together. With each
neighbor of i, we randomly pick a neighbor of u, check whether they could be link together, if
yes then recursively do this step with neighbor of i and u. Finally, each demand node in VP
would be linked to one node in VS .
For comparison, we consider our algorithms GSA, SPA-C, SPA-S, as well as a random algo-
rithm that selects power grid users randomly and then applying targeted influence maximization
algorithm in the SN to influence those users.
6.2 Vulnerability of smart grid
In this section, we demonstrate the existence as well as the damage caused by MAPSS on the
power grid. The measure we considered in this section is the number of failed nodes, which is
defined as the number of users which do not have a path through the active transmission lines
connecting them to any of the power generation sources.
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Figure 4: Varying Line Capacity
In Fig. ??, we vary the capacity on the transmission lines. A 110% capacity denotes that the
capacity on each line is 110% of the initial flow given by the dataset. We also fix the maximum
possible load change at each user to be 25% of its initial demand, according to the selection in
[25]. The number of seeds is 5/20/50 for IEEE 30 bus/IEEE 300 bus/Pegase 1354 bus test cases
respectively. From the result, we observe that all the algorithms are able to cause a large impact
to the power network and the impact is subdued with higher capacity. Among the algorithms,
SPA-S is capable of causing more severe damage compared with the others. For the other three
algorithms, however, although SPA-C displays some superiority against GSA and Random, the
performance of them are not stable. We also notice that the impacts of SPA-C and SPA-S drop
to 0 with high capacity on lines, which is due to the fact that the result of Alg. 3, cii.seeds is
too large.
In Fig. ??, we fix the capacity at 130%, max load change at 25% and varying the number
of seed nodes allowed. Although SPS-S still constantly performs much better, the result may
seem controversial as the percentage of failed nodes is not increasing with more seeds. However,
it can be explained. One possibility is that as failure of transmission lines is mainly due to non-
proportionally distributed demand, such scenario can happen when only a few users increased
their demand. When more users increased their demand, the flow can even be more balanced.
Thus, having more seeds may not guarantee a more severe failure. Another possibility is that
in the social network, a very limited set of seed nodes is enough for influencing the majority of
nodes, so that increasing the number of seeds will not have much impact.
6.3 Controlled Load Shedding
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of CLS and demonstrate that it depends on the
state of the power grid when it is applied. In Fig. 6, we consider a scenario in the IEEE 300 bus
dataset when 10 users increased their demand and a five-round cascade was triggered. Before
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Figure 5: Varying Number of Seeds
each round of cascade, we solve the CLS problem to obtain the minimum yield drop so as to
prevent any further cascade. The yield is defined as: Yield = The actual demand at stabilityThe original demand . We use
yield as the measure since load shedding will decrease the demand, which cannot be reflected by
number of failed nodes. The yield naturally gives an assessment of the severity of the cascade
as well as the cost to prevent further cascade. Clearly, CLS is more effective when applied to
earlier rounds of cascade. Also, CLS can always help reducing the yield drop as long as the
network is not stable.
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Figure 6: Protection by CLS. The yield of round 5 means no CLS is applied.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the importance of social network in achieving the vision of smart
grid. However, that comes with a price. We investigated new threats to the smart grid when
social network is linked with it, by study the problem MAPSS and analyze the impact on the
power grid. We also proposed the SPA algorithm which considers the cascading failure of the
power grid in case of MAPSS. Misinformation propagation and cascading failure contribute to
the severeness of these attacks as demonstrated by the experiments. For the future work, we
will consider more user parameters for social network for smart grid and impact of failure of a
substation on the social network connectivity. We are also interested in the protection strategies
against MAPSS and smart attackers.
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